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I.
INTRODUCTION
The Backman Property is landlocked. The underlying issue in this appeal is whether or
not Idaho law permits landlocked property to remain landlocked. Respondents Spagon, et al.
("Spagon") and Respondents Grant ("Grant") cite to cases and submit arguments that, taken
collectively, would result in Idaho real property remaining landlocked, unused, unoccupied and
undeveloped. Such a result directly contravenes Idaho's stated public policies reflected in this
Court's prior decisions promoting the use, occupancy and cultivation of land, and that oppose
leaving property landlocked.
The fact is that Idaho law does provide mechanisms to obtain access to landlocked
property.

These mechanisms are rooted in the public policies that promote the use and

occupancy of land and oppose leaving property landlocked. Backmans have presented three
alternative theories pursuant to which this Court could grant them access to the Landlocked
Backman Property. If Backmans fail to establish their claim for a prescriptive easement, then the
necessity is established for Backmans' easement by necessity and private condemnation claims.
If the Court denies Backmans' claim for an easement by necessity, then Backmans should be
permitted to privately condemn access to the landlocked Backman Property.
Here, Backmans did not freely convey away the access to their property. On the
contrary, the Backman Property has been landlocked since its patent in 1905. Although all of the
property in Sections 7 and 8 was historically used for logging, the current state of the land
reflects increasing residential development. Section 7 is checkered with 10- to 20-acre private
residential developments. If the roles were reversed and the Spagon and Grant properties were
landlocked, they would be entitled to benefit from the Idaho statutes and caselaw enabling

APPELLANTS' E P L Y BRIEF - Page 1
1 \ I 547 1 I IMPPEAL\Appellants' Reply Brief doc

landowners to obtain access to their Iandlockcd property. Simply, a group of private landowners
should not be permitted to landlock neighboring property.
Permitting Backmans to access their property promotes the strong public policy of the
State of Idaho favoring the use, occupancy and cultivation of land. This Court should find that
Rackmans have access to the Backman Property either by an easement by necessity, private
condemnation or a prescriptive easement.
A.

This Court Should Hold That Backmans Are Permitted To Access The Backman
Propcrtv With An Easement Bv Necessitv.
1.

Backmans' Evidence of Common Ownership bv the United States is
Sufficient to Satisfv the UniW of Title Element of Their Easement bq:
Necessitv Claim.
There is a split of authority in both the caselaw and secondary materials regarding

whether or not government ownership satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by
necessity claim. Not surprisingly, Spagon and Grant advocate for a different rule and cite to the
cases and treatises in line with their position. Of all of the cases cited by Spagon and Grant in
their respective Respondents' Briefs, only two expressly hold that government ownership does
not satisfy the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. Guess v. Azur, 57 So.2d

443 (Fl. 1952); Stale v. Black Bros., 297 S.W. 213 (Tex. 1927). The more recent case is dated
1952.
Contrary to Spagon's argument, the United States Supreme Court's decision in

Leo Sheep Co. v. United Stutes does not directly address whether or not government ownership
satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim asserted. by a private
landowner. 440 U.S. 668 (1979) . Instead, the issue addressed by the Court in Leo Sheep was
whether the Union Pacific Act of 1862 carried with it an implied reservation of access in favor of
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the federal government over the lands that had been granted to private railroads. Id at 680-81.
In Leo Sheep,the federal government sought an implied easement to build a road over adjacent
land owned by private landowners. Id. at 669. In rejecting the government's easement by
necessity claim, the Court explained:
Where a private landowner conveys to another individual a
portion of his lands in a certain area and retains the rest, it is
presumed at common law that the grantor has reserved an
easement to pass over the granted property is such passage is
necessary to reach the retained property. These rights-of-way
are referred to as "easements by necessity." There are two
problems with the Government's reliance on that notion in
this case. First of all. whatever right of passage a private
landowner might have, it is not at all clear that it would
include the right to construct a road for public access to a
recreational area. More importantly, the easement is not
actually a matter of necessitv in this case because the
Government has the power of eminent domain.

..,.
The applicability of the doctrine of easement by necessity in
this case is, therefore, somewhat strained, and ultimately of
little significance. The pertinent inquirv in this case is the
intent of Congress when it granted land to the Union Pacific
in 1862. The 1862 Act specifically listed reservations to the
grant, and we do not find the tenuous relevance of the
common-law doctrine of ways of necessity sufficient to
overcome the inference prompted by the omission of any
reference to the reserved right asserted by the Government in
this case. It is possible that Congress gave the problem of
access little though; but it is at least a likely that the thought
which was given focused on negotiation, reciprocity
considerations, and the power of eminent domain as obvious
devices for ameliorating disputes.
Id. at 679-80 (emphasis added) .

Leo Sheep involved a limited analysis of a federal railroad land grant statute in the
context of the federal government's claim for an easement by necessity to provide public access
to recreational property. Therefore, Leo Sheep is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
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Here, no federal statute is at issue and Backmans are privale landowners with no power of
eminent domain seeking private access to their private property. In any event, Leo Sheep, as a
United States Supreme Court decision, represents, at best, only persuasive authority on a
question of Idaho state law.
The more recent treatises and decisions cited in Backmans' Appellants' Brief
recognize that the better rule is to allow government ownership to satisfy the unity of title
element of an easement by necessity claim. As one commentator explained:
Special problems concerning easements by necessity are
encountered where the only unity of title was the original
ownership by the government. A considerable number of
decisions can be found refusing to allow an easement by
necessity where the claimant has relied upon such original
unity of ownership. The courts did not base these decisions
upon the prerogative of the sovereign. There are, however,
some decisions permitting easements by necessity upon such
proof, and this is believed to represent the wiser holding ....
It has been suggested that the more liberal rule would permit
every remote grantee of a portion of the public domain to
have an easement of way by necessity over surrounding
lands. This argument overlooks the special terminability
aspect of easements by necessity upon a change of
circumstances.
The changed circumstances effectively
eliminate the necessity.
4 Michael Allan Wolf (ed.), Powell on Real Property § 34.07[4] (2006), p. 34-59

-

34-60

(emphasis added).
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes

2.15 (2000), also supports

government ownership as satisfying the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim.
The general Restatement rule as to easements by necessity provides:
2.15 Servitudes Created By Necessity

A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land
conveyed to the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, of
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rights necessary to reasonable enjoyment of the land implies
the creation of a servitude granting or reserving such rights,
unless the language or circumstances of the conveyance
clearly indicate that the parties intended to deprive the
property of those rights.
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (i 2.15 (2000). Comment c. to this section, entitled
"Severance of rights arising out of common ownership is required," states that "Servitudes by
necessity arise only on severance of rights held in a unity of ownership .... Servitudes by
necessity arise on conveyances by governmental bodies as well as by other grantors." (Emphasis
added.) Id, at cmt. c.
The parties agree that Roberts v. Swim is the only Idaho case addressing
government ownership and the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim.
117 Idaho 9 (Ct.App. 1989). As Grant recognizes in its Rcspondents' Brief, Idaho Court of
Appeals' decisions are not binding case law precedent on the Idaho Supreme Court. State v.

Morton, 140 Idaho 235, 238 (2004). The Court of Appeals' decision in Roberts would perhaps
be more persuasive if it had included an analysis of why it determined that government
ownership did not satisfy the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim or such a
determination was germane to the case. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely cited to an A.L.R.
annotation. Roberts, 117 Idaho at 15. Importantly, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to
the district court to craft more particularized findings on the claimant's prescriptive easement
claim. Id. at 16-17, As such, the Court did not need to address, in dicta, the easement by
necessity claim.
Backmans submit that the better rule of law is that government ownership
satisfies the unity of title element of an easement by necessity claim. Such a rule would promote
Idaho's "sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or successful
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cultivation." Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 79 (Ct.App. 1983) (quoting Burley Brick & Sand

Co. v. Cofir, 102 Idaho 333, 335 (1981)). For these reasons, this Court should overrule the dicla
reference in Roberts and hold that Backmans proved the unity of title element of their easement
by necessity claim with evidence of the common ownership by the United States.

2.

Backmans Proved Necessity for the Easement to Access the Idandlocked
Backman Proaertv.
Backmans proved that there has never been legal access to the Backman Property

since the date the Backman Property was first patented by the United States government. The
District Court found the Backman Property was historically and is presently landlocked, and that
unless the District Court ordered access, the Backman Property would remain landlocked.
R. Vol. II., p. 268. Backmans submit that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" elements of an easement by necessity claim.
Spagon's argument about the historical existence or nonexistence of roads across
Section 7 is not relevant to the Court's decision in this case. Idaho case law holds that an actual
developed road need not exist at the time of severance. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 79. As explained
by the court in Cordwell:
It should be reemphasized that the existence of a way of
necessity does not depend upon what use the common owner
was making of the roads existing at the time of severance.
Such easement could arise even if at the time of severance
there was no road across the grantor's property to the part
conveyed. Thus, a remote grantee of land not being used at
the time of severance-as in the present case-may
nevertheless, when the use becomes necessary to the
enjoyment of his property, claim the easement under this
remote deed.

Id. (emphasis added) .
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Backmans also proved great present necessity for an access easement. Proof of
"strict" necessity for an easement is only required where the claimant owns other lands that abut
a public way. Cordwell, 105 Idaho at 80. Here, the Backman Property is landlocked. Therefore,
Backmans were only required to prove that access was reasonably necessary. Id. Backmans
proved that the Backman Property has always been legally landlocked and set forth an existing
route that had been used for over seventy (70) years to access the Backman Property.
Backmans' proposed route is the only reasonable route providing access to Section 8.
Backmans' road expert, Scott Rasor, testified that except for the three extensions off of
Turtle Rock RoadISyringa Creek Road accessing the Backman Property from the west, he did
not find any other feasible access to the Backman Property from the north, east or south.
Tr. p. 144-45.
This Court should hold that Backmans' proof and the District Court's factual
findings are sufficient to establish the "necessity" elements and hold that Backmans are entitled
to an easement by necessity over and across Turtle Rock Road/Syringa Creek Road, and the
three extensions, onto the Backman Property. This case should then be remanded to the District
Court to determine the scope of the easement.

B.

Backmans Should Be Permitted To Privately Condemn An Easement For Access To
The Backman Pro~ertv.
Backmans have proved the elements of their private condemnation claim. Spagon would

have this Court believe that Cohen v. Larson represented this Court's rejection of private
condemnation for the purpose of obtaining access to residences. 125 Idaho 82 (1993) . Contrary
to Spagon's characterization of that case, Cohen is not dispositive. The Court in Cohen did not
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address Idaho Code (i 7-701, which expressly states that "[blyroads, leading from highways to
residences" is a public use for which "the right of eminent domain may be exercised."
The Court in Cohen recognized the legislature's role in defining the changing
characteristics of "public uses" under Idaho law. The Court stated:
The notion of public use is a flexible one depending on the needs
and wants of the community, and we note that the public, the
legislature, and the courts of this state have demonstrated an
awareness of public benefits, including environmental and
population concerns, that perhaps were not recognized a century
ago.
Id. at 84. Thus, the Court recognized that the definition of "public use" must he interpreted by

looking beyond the four corners of the Idaho Constitution. Despite such recognition, however,
the Court failed to analyze the case in light of the statute that is directly on point regarding public
use - Idaho Code (i 7-701.

Cohen is further distinguishable in light of the fact that the claimants seeking to privately
condemn access already had legally available alternative access by way of Lake Coeur d'Alene.

Cohen, 125 Idaho at 85 n.3 ("The development the group seeks can occur with or without this
road."). Thus, this existing legal access further distinguishes Cohen from the issues at bar. The
Court in Cohen held only that the development of seven lakeside houses or condominiums on
Lake Coeur d'Alene with legally available water access is not a "public use" under Article I,
Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution. Cohen's holding, therefore, does not apply to Backmans'
claim to privately condemn access pursuant to Idaho Code $ 7-701(5) and is limited to its facts
Spagon attempts to characterize Dengler v. IIuzel Blessinger Family Trusr as an
affirmation of Spagon's overly broad reading of Cohen. This reading is a red herring. Spagon
states that the Court in Dengler "rejected the proposition of condemnation to a private residence

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - Page 8
I:\) 547.1 IlUPPI:Ai~\Appcllanls' Reply Bricfdoc

as a reasonable alternative." Brief of Respondents Spagon, el a/., p. 3 1-32. Dengler, however,
involved a claim by prospective purchasers of property against the vendor for breach of contract
when the vendor failed to obtain an easement to access the subject landlocked property.
141 ldaho 123, 129 (2005) . The Court found that obtaining the access easement was a condition
precedent to the vendor's conveyance of the property, and failure of the condition excused the
vendor's performance. Id. After the Court determined that the vendors' attempts to obtain an
access easement were reasonable, the prospective purchasers at oral argument claimed that the
vendor should have condemned access to the property. Id.

The Court rejected this notion

stating that, "pursuant to Idaho Code the only relevant use of condemnation relates to 'Byroads,
leading from highways to residences and farms.' I.C. § 7-701(5). The prooerty at issue here was
neither a residence nor a farm." Id. (emphasis added). The Court further determined that where
the contract called for "reasonable" terms regarding the easement, condemnation was not a
reasonable requirement to impose on the vendor. Id.
Thus, the issue in Dengler was whether the vendor should have condemned access
through adjacent property to satisfy the condition precedent in the contract. The Court found that
the property was not a residence or farm and, therefore, condemning access would not be a
public use under Idaho Code

3 7-701(5).

Contrary to Spagon's assertion, the Courl in Dengler

did not hold that condemning access to a residence is unreasonable. Rather, the Court in Dengler
determined only that the parties' contract did not require the vendor to condemn access to the
subject property. Id.
The determination as lo whether a party is entitled to exercise the right of private
condemnation is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. McKenney v
Anselmo, 91 ldaho 118, 122 (1966); Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,270 (1950). The fact that
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Backmans seek to build one (1) residence on each of the five (5) 20-acre parcels on the Backman
Property is undisputed. Backmans' desire to build residences on the Backman Property is a
public use for which Backmans may privately condemn access pursuant to Idaho Code

5 7-701(5).
The additional facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate the following:
1) Backmans' desired residential development of the Backman Property (one [I] residence on
each of the five [5] 20-acre parcels) is equal to or less invasive than the residential development
in Section 7, which consists of residences on 10- or 20-acre parcels; and, 2) the Backman
Property is landlocked. Backmans seek to condemn routes to the Backman Property that have
existed for over seventy (70) years. Spagon and Grant have not and do not now suggest a
specific, alternate route is both legally available to Backmans and more reasonable than
Backmans' proposed routes. The access which Backmans desire to condemn is necessary for the
use of the Backman Property. The Backman Property is landlocked and there is no legally
available alternative access.

Backmans' proposed development is virtually identical to the

development in Section 7.

For these reasons, this Court should hold that Backmans are

permitted to condemn access to the Backman Property. The case should be remanded to the
District Court to determine the compcnsation to be paid for the condemnation and the scope of
the easement.
At least one state has held that its private condemnation statute effectively abrogates
common law easement by necessity claims in that state. In Ferguson Ranch, Inc. v. Murray, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that its legislaturc resolved the competing policy considerations
supporting the productivity of land and opposing the taking of a landowner's property without
compensation by enacting a statute permitting private condemnation.
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81 1 P.2d 287, 289

(Wyo. 1991) . Wyoming's condemnation statute is more specific than Idaho's in its applicability
to landlocked property owners, stating that "Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor
connection with a public road, may apply in writing ... for a private road leading from his
premises to some convenient public road.? Wyoming Statutes

9

24-9-101. Although Idaho's

condemnation statute does not so specifically refer to landlocked property, this Court could
determine, as the Wyoming Supreme Court determined, that the legislature's intent regarding
Idaho Code

5 7-701(5) was to balance competing policy interests and provide a mechanism for

obtaining access to landlocked property for certain enumerated purposes. Such a determination
would, effectively, make Idaho Code $ 7-701 a last resort for parties seeking to obtain access to
landlocked property while promoting the public policies of this State.

C.

The District Court's Dismissal Of Backmans' Prescriative Easement Claim Should
Be Reversed And The Case Should Be Remanded To The District Court For A
Determination As To Whether Backmans Proved The Five Elements Of A
Prescriptive Easement.
Backmans submit that the District Court erred as a matter of law by misapplying various

presumptions not applicable to Backmans' prescriptive easement claim. The District Court erred
in characterizing Powers's use as "public," in applying the wild and unenclosed lands
presumption, and in applying the common use rule. As a result of these errors, the District Court
did not properly consider the evidence presented as it pertained to the five elements of a
prescriptive easement claim. Backmans submit that the record contains ample evidence to
support a finding that their immediate predecessor-in-interest's, Randy Powers, use of Turtle
Rock RoadlSyringa Creek Road and the extensions thereto satisfied the five elements of a
prescriptive easement claim. For these reasons, this Court should remand the case to the District
Court.
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D.

The District Court Erred In Failinv To Combine Easement By Necessity, Private
Condemnation AndlOr Prescrintive Easement Theories To Provide Access To The
Landlocked Backman Property.
The District Court should have permitted Backmans to combine the theories of easement

by necessity, private condemnation and/or prescriptive easement to provide access to the
landlocked Backman Property. Spagon and Grant do not cite to any authority prohibiting the
combination of these theories.

This case should be remanded to the District Court for a

determination as to the theories to be used to provide Backmans with access to the Backman
Property and the scope of such access in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.

E.

S n a ~ o nAnd Grant Are Not Entitled To Attorneys' Fees And Costs On Apneal.
Backmans' appeal asks this Court to review the District Court's conclusions of law.

Backmans do not invite this Court to second-guess the District Court's factual findings.
'Therefore, this Court should decline to award Spagon and Grant their costs and attorney fees on
appeal. See, Becksreadv. f'rice, 146 Idaho 57, 190 P.3d 876,888 (2008).

11.
CONCLUSION
The Backman Property is landlocked and at the mercy of the adjacent landowners who
have refused to grant Backmans an easement. Public policy in Idaho supports the use of
property.

The District Court erred in denying Backmans' easement by necessity, private

condemnation and prescriptive easement claims. The District Court also erred in declining to
combine such theories to provide access to the Backman Property. As Backmans' appeal seeks
the review of the District Court's conclusions of law, Spagon and Grant are not entitled to
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal.
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This Court should either reverse the District Court's decision and hold that Backmans are
entitled to a prescriptive easement or easement by necessity, or to condemn an easement to
access their landlocked property, or remand to the District Court to make a decision consistent
with this Court's opinion.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

lothday of November 2008.

MEULEMAN MOLLERUP LLP

By:
Attorneys ~ o ~ A ~ ~ e l l a 6 s
Bob Backman and Rhonda Backman
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 0 ' ~day of November 2008, true and correct copies
(2) of the foregoing document were served via United States First-Class Mail upon each of the
following parties:
Scott W. Reed, Esq.
Attorney at Law
Post Office Box A
Coeur d7A1ene, Idaho 83816
Telephone: 2081664-2 161
Facsimile: 2081765-5 1 17
Counsel For Dejendants/Respondents Spagon, Lloyd .Johnson, Zirwes,
Bessler, Millward, McKenna and the Associalion
Brent C. Featherston, Esq.
Featherston Law Firm Chtd.
1 13 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Telephone: 2081263-6866
Facsimile: 2081263-0400
Counsel For Defindant/Respondent Schrader
Peter C. Erbland, Esq.
Paine, Hamblen, Coffin, Brooke & Miller LLP
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101
Post Office Box E
Coeur dlAlene, Idaho 838 16-0328
Telephone: 2081664-8 1 15
Facsimile: 2081664-6338
Counsel For Defendants/Respondents Grant
With one copv via U.S. Mail to:
Michael E. Reagan, Esq.
Liesche & Reagan, PA
1044 Northwest Boulevard, Suite D
Coeur dlAlene. Idaho 838 14
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